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STATE TERROR, ECONOMIC POLICY AND SOCIAL RUPTURE
DURING THE ARGENTINE ' PROCESO, " 1976-1981
Death did rot always govern Therp were rebellions
against that severe law. (When) space and time were
conquered by peace and life. . . But there are many
things between earth and sky which invoke disquiet
. . . Not so much what man does to other men, but what
he does to himself. . .If the collective conscience
does not succeed in exorcising the(se) demons, the
future shall be a quagmire.
Miguel Bonasso, Recuerdo de la Muerte , 1984
Introduction
The military regime that held power in Argentina from 1976 to 1983 is
best remembered for offering an excellent case study of failed authoritarian
rule. Even so, as an extended exercise in dominio (the term Gramsci used to
refer to the coercive "moment of force" by which dominant social groups, as
represented by political regimes, use the state to physically control
subordinate groups and impose their will on civil society) , the
self-designated "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" (Process of National
Reorganization) was unprecedented in its systematic use of state terror to
achieve regime objectives. At both the external (foreign relations) and
internal (domestic program) levels, the military regime's basic approach
towards achieving policy objectives was underscored by a prompt recourse to
coercion. Internally, this was manifest in the infamous "dirty war" against
leftist subversion, which started out as an anti-guerrilla campaign and
degenerated into the death, "disappearance" and torture of at least 9,000
civilians (including scores of children and pregnant women) at the hands of
military and para-military death squads. Externally, it was evident in the
murder, intimidation, and kidnapping of Argentine exiles aboard, the
saber-rattling that accompanied the territorial dispute with Chile over the
Beagle Channel islands in 1978, active support for the military coup d'etat in
Bolivia in 1978, involvement in the training and supply of right-wing military
and para-military forces in Central America frcm 1979 to 1982, ending with the
forcible re-occupation of the Falklands/ Malvinas islands that year.
However, while much has been made of the fact that the Falklands/Malvinas
debacle proved to be the Argentine Cyprus, and while attention has most often
focused on the more overt transgressions of the "Proceso"— the gross
violations of human rights and pervasive corruption under the military regime
— less attention has been accorded two other facets that were integral parts
of this exercise in dominio ; the use of state terror as a complement to a
particular economic and social program, and the subtle use of terror to
enforce the acquiesence of those most adversely affected by that program.
This essay will therefore attempt to address both of these subjects, and
thereby garner a more complete picture of the various facets of authoritarian
domination imposed by military rule in Argentina from 1976 to 1981
.
I. Argentina under the "Proceso"; A Conceptual and Contextual Overview .
It should not appear incongruous that the Argentine "Proceso" be
considered in neo-Gramscian terms. To the contrary, the context in which
Gramsci wrote in many respects resembles the Argentine situation after World
War Two. The fundamental dichotomy of the agrarian and industrial sectors
that resulted frcm the shift in the Argentine mode of production during the
first half of the twentieth century, 1 the ensuing emergence of the urban
industrial classes (particularly the domestic bourgeoisie and the organized
labor movement) as economic and political actors, and the ongoing situation of
chronic political instability marked by frequent regime change and the
inability of contending social groups to establish a minimum level of con-
sensus, much less agree to the hegemonic project of any of them in the
interest of political stability, combined to produce a period of ongoing
hegemonic stalemate and political crisis during the postwar years that echoed
the Italian experience of the late teens and early twenties. Thus, while the
fit is by no means hermetic or universally transferable, a neo-Gramscian
approach offers a lucid theoretical framework with which to analyze the
context in which the Argentine "Proceso" emerged and subsequently ruled.
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With this in mind, it should come as no surprise to see that in many
respects Gramsci proved remarkably, albeit unknowingly, prescient in
forecasting the conditions surrounding the military's assumption of power in
Argentina in March, 1976. To wit, the period immediately preceeding military
intervention can be conceived as "a phase in the class struggle that preceeds:
either the conquest of power on the part of the revolutionary proletariat. . .
or a tremendous reaction on the part of the propertied classes and governing
caste . . .".3 its most overt manifestation was a full-scale guerrilla war
waged by leftist groups against the Army in the northern province of Tucuman,
rampant sectarian violence between leftist and rightist terrorist groups in
the cities that resulted in an average of over three politically-motivated
murders a day, the virtual breakdown of traditional party lines and
competition, a sustained wave of strikes, work stoppages, and industrial
sabotage that paralyzed production, a huge fiscal deficit, an inflation rate
exceeding 500 percent, and rapid disinvestment by foreign capital, which
aggravated an already severe balance of payments problem, 4 all of this
compounded by the institutional paralysis afflicting the Peronist regime
elected in 1973.
It should be understood that Gramsci 's remark overstates the case, as the
Argentine proletariat was by no means universally revolutionary. In fact, the
bulk of the pclitical violence meted out during this period was the work of
opposed extremist factions within the Peronist labor movement and their
various political allies both within and without the Peronist regime. What is
no exaggeration is the fact that the cumulative effect of the continued and
increased level of internecine violence, coupled with the inability of the
Peronist regime to govern effectively, much less impose some modicum of social
order in the face of daily strife, led to a perception on the part of most
Argentines that the country was slipping into anarchic chaos. 5 in the words
of General Jorge Rafael Videla, first president of the "Proceso," ". . . in
March 1976, our nation was gripped by one of the most profound crises of its
existence, and, without a doubt, the gravest in its contemporary history . . .
(a) total crisis, whose most salient point was the total breakdown of the
institutional system, as power had reached a phase of disaggregation that left
Argentina framed in a picture of increased feudalization and headed towards
extinction. . ."6
In Gramsci's terms, this was a period of "organic crisis", that is, ". .
a crisis of authority. . a crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the
State." 7 In effect, with the charismatic presence of Juan D. Peron removed by
death in 1974, and with the government of Isabel Peron wracked by corruption
and factional infighting that were in many ways an internal reflection of the
external problem?: confronting it, by early 1976 the situation had become" . .
delicate and dangerous, because the field was open to violent solutions, for
the activities of unknown forces, represented by charismatic 'men of
destiny* ."8
Faced with the near complete disruption of social order and government
functions, and already engaged in a violent armed struggle with well-organized
groups that proposed to fundamentally alter the Catholic, capitalist
socio-economic parameters of Argentine society once they conquered power, the
armed forces decided to assume the role of "men of destiny" and steer the
country away from the Marxist abyss. In the words of Guillermo O'Donnell, the
level of threat posed against Argentine society was such that the military
could no longer refrain from assuming direct political control of the
country." In Gramsci's terms, they were compelled to become a "political
force that (moved) into action (because) 'legality' was in danger." 1 ^ To that
end, the armed forces stepped in and removed Isabel Peron from office in a
bloodless coup d'etat on March 24, 1976. These were the circumstances
surrounding the advent of this exercise in dominio that came to be known as
the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional." As such, we might add hegemonic
stalemate and organic crisis to the types of political climate George Lopez
has identified as likely to lead to regime change conducive to state terror.''
But what is it about the "Proceso" that allows its identification as an
exercise in dominio? After all, state terror and government coercion are
long-standing facts of human history.^ jf we accept the definition of
terrorism as "the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat,"^ and
that state terror is "a system of government that uses terror to rule,"^ then
what is there to distinguish the "Proceso" from other reigns of terror
extending back to antiquity? The reasons, I suggest, are two-fold. First,
because of the specific, yet subtlety demarcated and cross-cutting class
content of both the regime and the audience towards which state terror was
directed. Second, because of the systematic way in which it was utilized in
pursuit of specific policy objectives.
II. The Rationale of a neo-Gramscian approach .
For Gramsci, a social group (or groups) is dominant, that is, exercises
dominio , when ". . .it tends to 'liquidate,' or to subjugate perhaps even by
armed force. . " antagonistic groups, and "leads kindred and allied groups. "'5
After the March, 1976 golpe de estado , this was precisely the relationship of
the military regime with the domestic bourgeoisie and organized working
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classes, on the one hand, and the transnational/ agro-export sectors
on the other. Like any political regime, *in gaining control of the Argentine
state apparatus the military junta formally assumed a monopoly of legitimate
violence over a given territory, since "the exercise of repression is
juridically absent frcm civil society. The State reserves it as an exclusive
domain 11 16 (although it should be clear that private institutions within civil
society often use coercion on behalf of the state, particularly in times of
crisis). More Importantly, in assuming control of the state, the armed forces
tacitly accepted Gramsci's conception of the state as "a political
society-i.e. a dictatorship, or coercive apparatus to ensure that the masses
conform to the type of production and economy of a given moment."' 7 In effect,
the armed forces envisioned the state during the "Proceso" as "the site of the
armed domination or coercion of the (here transnational and landed)
bourgeoisie over the exploited classes. . . "J°
In this context, state terror can be conceived of as government
repression involving "the use of coercion or the threat of coercion against
opponents or potential opponents in order to prevent or weaken their
capability to oppose the authorities and their policies."^ Closer to the
specifics of the regime examined here, it also includes "any action taken
by the government which reduces the power of social classes, "^O in this case
the organized working classes and domestic bourgeoisie that were the mass
political support base of the Peronist regime that had preceeded the
"Proceso," and which the military elite and its civilian allies consequently
held responsible for the chaotic conditions they inherited. What is
significant about this case is that while coercion is one of several policy
*A (national) political regime being the collection of social groups and
political actors that gain control of the apex of the state, or what is
commonly known as government. This includes (re) formulating the basic
framework and rules of interaction governing the behavior of incumbents in
policy-making positions, as well as the rules that govern modes of access
to those positions.
instruments available to all regimes, during exercises in dominio such as the
"Proceso" it becomes the primary policy instrument, to which all others (such
as persuasion, exchange, compromise, and reasoned, legitimate authority) are
subsumed. We should recall that this conception of the state as primarily a
coercive instrument of specific dominant groups was facilitated by the
severity of the crisis that had confronted it in the period preceeding
military intervention, when not only were non-coercive policy instruments
ineffectual, but the very state monopoly of legal violence within the country
was being challenged at a variety of levels. The weakness of the state under
the Peronist regime, in other words, is what allowed the succeeding military
regime to reduce the very concept of state to its most basic, primitive, and
coercive level in an effort to re-assert its superordinate national
authority.
In assuming this role as "men of destiny," the Argentine military
hierarchy envisioned themselves in quasi-gnostic terms along the lines Gramsci
had once offered for the Italian revolutionary classes. That is, they were
"at once a force of movement and a repository of past and present cultural
values"^ who, in the absence of hegemony as the normal form of control, were
forced to resort to coercion, which becomes dominant only in times of
crisis.^
The concept of hegemony (egemonia) has a long history in Marxist thought,
and has been the subject of considerable, often bitter debate. 23 This is not
the place to engage lengthy discussion of the precise — or preferred —
meaning of the term. What is relevant to our concerns is that, contrary to
Leninist conceptions of hegemony as dictatorship of a class, with all the
coercive implications it is said to entail, Gramsci conceived of egemonia as
"a socio-political situation, a moment in which the philosophy of society fuse
or are in equilibrium, an order in which a certain way of life and thought is
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in
all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit
all taste, morality, customs, religious, and political principles, and all
social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation. "24
Hegemony therefore requires of dominant social groups that "account be taken
of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be
exercised, and that a certain balance or compromise be formed — in other
words, that the leading groups should make sacrifices of an economic-
corporative kind. "25 This opens the way for the establishment of potentially
counter-hegemonic apparatuses such as trade unions, alternative media and
educational networks, etc., on the part of subordinate groups.
It is in our use of the concepts of hegemony and domination where the
logic of a neo-Gramscian approach to the "Proceso" becomes apparent. Unlike
Lenin's rigid class approach and orthodox Marxist notions of hegemony and
domination, Gramsci's perspective displays a degree of subtlety that best
captures the nuances and complexities of the "Proceso." In doing so, it also
extends the thrust of recent debates over the nature of authoritarianism in
the Southern Cone.
Lenin's view of hegemony can essentially be equated with class dictator-
ship, of the proletariat preferably, but of a single class in any event. 26
This assumes a degree of cohesiveness and unanimity of consensus on the part
of socioeconomic classes that seldom has been seen anywhere, much less in
modern Argentina. We only need to consider the dilemmas inherent in dependent
capitalist development to see that cross-cutting cleavages are integral parts
of both civil and political society, to which can be overlapped the specific
cultural idiosyncracies pertinent to each case.
In modern Argentina, these cleavages cut across classes at the economic/
cultural, ideological, and political levels; recall the factional warfare
going on within the Peronist movement at the time of golpe . This argues
strongly against a rigid class analysis. Instead, a Gramscian
conceptualization of the base-superstructure relationship is needed.
Gramsci "narrowed the economic base to include only the material and technical
instruments of production; he broadened the superstructure to include
political society, civil society, and the state . . . (this) allowed for a
more complex superstructure but also reconsidered its relation to the base. "2'
In fact, we shall see that agro-export and transnational/financial
sectoral interests converged with conservative military and civilian interests
on security and negative ideological grounds (i.e. anti-Peronism) . These were
posed against the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie and working classes at
the economic, political, and social levels, since the latter constituted the
social bases of the Peronist movement, and hence were considered the ultimate
culprits in the debacle of the Peronist regime. Similarly, it will take a
more flexible class-based approach to adequately understand the way in which
the strategic placement of military officers in the state apparatus was
designed to mask the differentiated class content of the regime.
The importance of the latter trait stems from the fact that the state is
the primary vehicle for achieving and reproducing hegemony. Gramsci 's . .
"concept (of hegemony) focused on the capitalist state as distinct from the
capitalist class. The political class consciousness of capitalists manifests
itself through a hegemonic system in which the 'dominant group is coordinated
concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups' . . . (A.)s
important as material conditions are as a basis for hegemony, political and
ideological conditions are even more important. The hegemonic system is
political in that it uses the state apparatus as its central organ. Political
class consciousness is the basic underpinning of the hegemonic system, and it
coexists with the corporate economic interest that propels the economic
machine of the capitalist system." 28 Given the Gramscian emphasis on non-
econanic factors, it should be obvious that differences in political culture
(understood as a set of political values, behavior patterns, and historic
memory common to a society) fundamentally condition the environment in which
distinct hegemonic projects emerge, and in the case of Argentina in the early
1970s, precluded the emergence of a hegemonic project of any sort. 29 Most
relevant to our concerns here, it was in its use of the state apparatus to
disarticulate the existing political culture that the "Proceso" revealed
itself to be lacking in genuine hegemonic aspirations.
With regard to domination, the Leninist view is limited to the physical
and political subordination of one socioeconomic class to another (however
couched in non-coercive terms). While this is an essential element of
exercises in dcminio , the Leninist view reduces the relationship of domination
and hegemony to an instrumental level. In fact, they are often confused as
synonyms (i.e. class dictatorship = hegemony). This is because Lenin believed
that hegemony is achieved via the domination of one class over others. That
is, class dictatorship, and thus hegemony, is impost by force upon
subordinate classes, and eventually results in the elimination of these
classes. 30
This is precisely what distinguishes the Gramscian conceptualization of
these terms. For Gramsci, hegemony implies the willing consent of subordinate
classes to the leadership of a dominant bloc that often cuts across class
lines, which in turn grants a series of superstructural concessions. It is
fundamentally a non-coercive relationship (albeit discreetly buttressed by the
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"armour of coercion"). T.J. Jackson Lears states the case nicely: "For
Gramsci, consent and force nearly always coexist, though one or the other
predominates. The Tsarist regime, for example, ruled primarily through
domination — that is, by monopolizing the instruments of coercion. Among
parliamentary regimes only the weakest are forced to rely on domination;
normally they rule through hegemony, even though the threat of officially
sanctioned force always remains implicit. Ruling groups do not maintain their
hegemony merely by giving their domination the aura of moral authority through
the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols; they must also seek to
win the consent of subordinate groups to the existing social order. "^^ Hence,
daminio is more properly seen as fundamentally a coercive relationship, one
that exists precisely because hegemony has not been obtained (or has been
lost). It is this notion of domination that pertains here. Yet here also,
the state is the primary instrument through which dominio is exercised. As we
shall see, this was well reflected in the orientation and organization of the
state apparatus under the "Proceso."
A distinguishing feature of regimes such as the "Proceso" is their
de-mobilizational orientation. Unlike European Fascism, which attempted to
reforge collective identities by mobilizing society on the basis of ideology
punctuated by state terror, the recent authoritarian experiments in the
Southern Cone were — and are — de-mobilizational in character. Their major
social object is to disrupt subordinate group collective identities through
the systematic use of exclusionary policies backed by state terror in an
effort to alter and reconstitute the historic memory of these groups. 32
To these general characteristics can be added the more discreet
idiosyncracies of the "Proceso": the specific class content of the regime, the
de-industralizing economic project (which stood in marked contrast to the
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economic projects promoted by similar regimes in Brazil and Chile during the
same period, as well as a previous Argentine experiment from 1966 to 1973),
and the social project underlying the use of state terror. As shall become
apparent, use of a neo-Gramscian approach, especially his notion of
"historical bloc" along with hegemony and domination, will allow us to extend
the thrust of recent debates over' the nature of authoritarianism in the
Southern Cone, and thereby achieve a more precise idea of the variations that
exist w thin this particular regime type.
It is obvious that hegemony did not obtain in the period of immediately
preceeding the advent of the "Proceso." As I shall clarify further on,
neither did it afterwards. The point is that without hegemony as the normal
form of control, and given the magnitude of the crisis at the time, it should
not be surprising that the military regime opted for dcminio , of which state
terror is an integral part. As Sergio Zermeno aptly phrased it: "Are not
military dictatorships (such as the Proceso) the most obvious manifestation
of hegemonic incapacity at all levels, an incapacity that has been reiterated
since the demise of the oligarchic order? These military dictatorships, as
emergent instruments of coercion without consensual constraints, demonstrate
in patent fashion the triple [social, economic, and political] crisis of
hegemony that placed them on the scene numerous times, and which today makes
them inevitable. "33 when such moments occur, the balance between integrative
and repressive functions within the state apparatus sways inexorably towards
the latter. 34
III. State Terror .
The coercion associated with state terror comes in many guises and
forms. Most obvious is "active coercion," involving the use and threat of use
of violent force. Less visible, but often no less effective, is "covert" or
12
"subtle" coercion, Where the "power of a class is reduced by changes in the
rules of the game which define the structure of socio-econcmic activity, that
is, rules by which power is exercised in the struggle among classes over the
direction of society. "35 Moreover, there are differences and gradations
within these two types of coercion. John Sloan has called attention to the
different types of active coercion known as repression (i.e. the use of
governmental coercion to control or eliminate actual or potential opposition)
and the more extreme variant of repression known as enforcement terrorism
,
which is more likely to be lethal and cruel. 36
Similarly, we can distinguish between different types of covert or subtle
coercion. Here again, Gramsci understood that "the state had instruments of
control far more subtle and effective than dictatorial force, that the threat
of force was only one of a number of state functions, and that variations in
the legal-political forms of the state were highly significant. . .".3 7 Thus,
measures such as press censorship, rescinding of basic welfare legislation
for selected groups, direct government intervention and control of social
group organizations such as labor unions, prohibitions on the right to
assembly, speech, and thought, bans on literature, changes in school
curriculums, outlawing of political parties or social interest groups,
economic controls such as wage ceilings and the elimination of collective
bargaining, closure of public health facilities, rises in public
transportation rates, etc., represent some of the more subtle coercive
measures authoritarian regimes use to control those they view as antagonistic
to their rule.
Even the state apparatus itself reflects the different types of coercive
approaches. At a broad level, "concrete reorganizations in the state
apparatus reflect readjustments in the balance (or in Gramscian terms,
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"relation of forces") between social classes." 38 That is to say, "the state
apparatus, understood as the hierarchy and configuration of specific branches,
agencies, and functions of the state, adapts chameleon-like to the mutable
strategies used by the dominant classes against the dominated classes, and to
the dynamics of the internal balance of power within the dominant bloc."™ in
effect, "it is possible to conceive of the concrete distribution of functions
within the state apparatus, their degree of hierarchical-functional
concentration or separation, as forms of reproduction. . . imposed by the
development of social contradictions." 4 ^
During an exercise in dcminio , this becomes most apparent in the
consolidation, expansion, and promotion of the internal security apparatus,
most notably specialized agencies such as the intelligence services, secret
police, border guards, and gendarmes, as well as in the growth of
para-military groups and the reorientation of the armed forces 1 role towards
internal, rather than external security concerns. It is more subtly, although
no less evident in the transfer, decentralization, or demotion of the
institutional referents of specific social groups such as organized labor
(in this case most often embodied in a Labor Ministry), as well as in the
amount of resources allocated to and character of those employed in each of
them. The same applies for those agencies more generally concerned with the
provision of basic public goods such as health, welfare, and social security,
and social services like water and electricity, public housing and
transportation, etc. In most of these agencies, it is in the application of
negative measures where coercion becomes apparent. That is to say, upgrading
of agencies and services in these latter areas is most often used as an
incentive, inducement, or reward for cooperation, while the down-grading,
elimination, or curtailment of agencies and services is most often used a
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disincentive, constraint, or punishment for uncooperative or antagonistic
groups. Again, whatever the precise combination of measures used, "it is in
the sphere of dcminio that change in structure becomes immediately apparent,
and dcminio is always associated with coercion, state power, the 'moment of
force'." 41
During an exercise in dcminio , the use of coercion — in all of its
particular guises — is "designed to force compliance through a climate of
fear. "42 its goal is to intimidate into utter submission the body politic in
general, but more specifically those groups that may be opposed to the regime
or some of its policies. It is this climate of pervasive fear promoted by the
systematic and varied usage of coercion that, regardless of the precise
characterization applied, ultimately defines "state terror."
This was, in sum, the underlying rationale of the "Proceso." Alain
Rouquie characterized it thus: "The amplitude of the repression, the
brutality and decentralized character of the methods used. . . the impunity
of unit leaders within the armed forces, the use of torture, reprisals, and
summary executions, the disappearance of suspects, all point towards creating
a climate of dissuasive fear. "43
This climate of fear was dissuasive in the sense that it was designed to
intimidate the economically and politically out-of-favor — the organized
working classes and domestic bourgeoisie — from pressing revindicative claims
that would interfere with the regime's "liberal" or "neo-classic" economic
program (which was oriented towards reasserting the primacy of the agro-export
sector and transnational finance capital in the Argentine mode of production,
in order to fully exploit those areas where it was believed Argentina held a
competitive advantage in the world capitalist market).
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The climate of fear was dissuasive, also, in the sense that it was
designed to cower all those who were otherwise predisposed to object to the
overt class content and whole-scale abridgement of basic human rights of the
repressive campaign, particularly after the guerrillas were defeated in late
1977. This included all non-Peronist political parties, intellectual, legal,
professional, and human rights groups, and the resident foreign communities.
The sowing of fear was dissuasive, finally, in that it was designed to
show international Marxism that it could and would not find fertile ground in
Argentina so long as the armed forces were able to prevent it.
IV. Regime Type and the State .
During an exercise in dcminio such as the "Proceso," the concept and
functions of the state are narrowed and reduced to their most primitive form.
It becomes "a political society, dictatorship, apparatus of coercion (army,
police, administration, courts, bureaucracy, etc.), government (which equals
the state in the strict sense), apparatus of power, and domination."44 As a
particular form of dependent capitalist state, "it maintains and structures
class domination, in the sense that this domination is rooted principally in a
class structure that in turn has its foundation in the operation and
reproduction of capitalist relations of production. . . From this perspective
the state is, first and foremost, a relation of domination that articulates in
unequal fashion the components of civil society, supporting and organizing the
existing system of social domination. "45
More importantly, as a form of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" 46 rule, the
"Proceso" was a response "to important modifications of the relations of
production and to important stages of the class struggle."47 In other words,
the Argentine state apparatus under the "Proceso" reflected a particular type
of authoritarian response on the part of a specific coalition of social groups
(the "coup coalition" mentioned by O'Donnell) to the intense socio-economic
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conflicts surrounding their assumption of power. "From the point of view of
the dominant social groups that exercised power during these years. . . this
process signified an exceptional opportunity to consolidate their social
domination. " 4 ^
Gramsci's notion of "historical bloc" allows us to achieve better depth
when probing the nature of this particular "coup coalition." Succinctly
stated, Gramsci believed that "structures and superstructures form a
'Historical bloc'. "49 Here is where his implicit narrowing of the base and
expansion of the superstructure becomes apparent. "The idea of a historical
bloc departs significantly from notions of class embedded in the Marxist
traditions; it promotes analysis of social formations that cut across
categories of ownership and nonownership and that are bound by religious or
other ideological ties as well as those economic ties. . . And yet he remained
faithful to the Marxist tradition in granting casual priority to the economic
sphere under most conditions. The base does not determine specific forms of
consciousness, but it does determine what forms of consciousness are possible.
The process of interaction between spheres is characterized by the formation
and reformation of historical blocs, which, depending on their success in
forming alliances and disseminating a coherent ideology, may or may not came
to exert a hegemonic influence.
. .
. . . This vision is manifestly more complex than most anti-Marxist
critics have realized; it rejects the economic determinism of the Second
International; it broadens the notion of ideology rooting it in spontaneous
philosophy; it rejects the obsession with objective determinants of class by
introducing the idea of historical bloc; it acknowledges the role of the state
as a complex political entity, not merely a tool of the bourgeoisie. . . 50
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It is the Gramscian notion of historical bloc, imbedded in his
conceptualizations of hegemony and domination, that allow the particulars of
different military-bureaucratic regimes to become intelligible. Here it
incorporates and makes clear the cross-cutting ties and cleavages that
constitute the social boundaries of the "Proceso" with a degree of facility
not shared by either orthodox Marxist analyses or the current literature on
bureaucratic-authoritarianism. In fact, we might say that it is the
particulars of specific historical blocs, along with whether or not they have
a hegemonic project — and if so, the precise content of that project — that
allows us to generally distinguish between military-bureaucratic regimes.
In any event, because of the gravity of the threat posed by the crisis
leading up to the installation of the "Proceso" , and the fact that the very
nature of social relations had changed signficantly during the crisis, it was
felt that, as Gramsci once remarked, "so too must be the political methods
used, the resort to violence and the combination of legal and illegal
forces. "^ Specifically, it was believed that only through the systematic use
of state terror could the challenge to basic societal parameters posed by
Marxist subversion be decisively overcame.
Finally, the virtual "colonization of the State by the military," as
Rouquie labels it, 52 (the details of which will be elaborated upon shortly),
was by no means a product of chance. To the contrary, it was done precisely
to bestow an aura of professional neutrality on what was basically the
transparent intent of the financial/transnational and agro-export elites to
reassert their dominance over the rest of Argentine society after a period
during which this dominance had been seriously — and often violently
— questioned. In a sense, the military leaders of the "Proceso" well
understood Poulantzas 1 hypothesis that the state "best serves the interests of
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the capitalist class only when members of this class do not participate
directly (or at least overtly or as a majority) in the state apparatus, that
is to say, when the ruling class is not the politically governing class . "53
Phrased differently, the military as an institution agreed to assume
control of goverrment while their civilian allies formulated and implemented
economic policies that both groups believed would promote a basic
restructuring of Argentine society. This division of labor was amply evident
in the state apparatus. More broadly, this type of arrangement was replicated
to greater or lesser degree under the military-bureaucratic regimes installed
in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), Peru (1968), and Uruguay (1973). Differences
in the programs attempted by each responds to differences in the composition
of their respective coup coalitions cum historic blocs. In this case, the
economic interests of the agro-export and transnational elites were juxtaposed
against those of the domestic bourgeoisie as well as the working classes,
since the former were considered "traitorous" because of their historical
identification with the Peronist movement. 54
As a result, the military-bureaucratic regime installed in 1976 consisted
of the upper and most transnationally-oriented fractions of the Argentine
bourgeoisie, the traditional landed and agro-export sectors, to which were
joined, on ideological grounds, the armed forces leadership and the
conservative church hierarchy. In turn, the "Proceso" economically and
politically turned its back on the subordinate fractions of the bourgeoisie as
well as the lower and working classes. This was done with the understanding
that the "State can only truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is
relatively autonomous from the diverse (and here subordinate) fractions of
this class, precisely in order to be able to organize the hegemony of the
whole of this class. "55 Whether the agro-export elites and transnational
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sectors of the Argentine bourgeoisie did in fact have a hegemonic project, or
were instead content to reassert their economic and political dominance over
the more national and urban industrial sectors of the bourgeoisie, is open to
question. What is fact is that during the initial phase of their rule
(1976-1981), they and their military and civilian allies deemed it necessary
to impose a period of dominio in order to cleanse Argentine society of the
economic and political malignancies that had brought the country to the verge
of collapse. ^6
I will now proceed to develop the details of this project, at least as it
was manifest in the varied use of state terror as a complement to economic anc"
social policy. For the moment, what I have tried to do is phase the context in
which the "Proceso" emerged in terms that are most consonant with the
realities of the Argentine experience. One need not hold a strong ideological
position to realize that the recent economic and political conflicts between
Argentine social groups have generally been played out both along class lines
and in zero-sum fashion. Thus, rather than offer it as a rigidly ideological
explanation, I have undertaken this conceptual-contextual excursion in order
to address three main concerns.
Generally, to show how the notion of state terror can be safely
integrated into a broader theoretical framework without suffering appreciable
loss of definition. More specifically, to demonstrate the viability of a
neo-Gramscian perspective as a conceptual framework for understanding the
general context and circumstances of the "Proceso." Finally, by doing so
correct erroneous assumptions that Marxist thought offers little in the way of
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positive analytic constructs for understanding the nature of state terror in
the modern world, particularly as it appeared in Argentina from 1976 to
1981. 57
V. The "Proceso": State Structure, Economic Program, Social Policy, and the
use of State Terror .
As a type of military-bureaucratic authoritarian regime, the "Proceso de
Reorganizacion Nacional" differed substantially from previous Argentine
exercises in non-competitive rule. Whereas other coups during the postwar era
had at most resulted in the partial militarization of the apex of the Argentine
state apparatus, with most of the uniformed personnel concentrated in
defense-relate agencies, as provincial governors, or in very high ranking
positions,^ here the extent of militarization of the upper echelons of the
state apparatus was unprecedented in that it was virtually complete. With the
exceptions of the Ministry of Economy (entirely controlled by civilians) and
the Ministry of Education ( in which the military shared management positions
with like-minded civilians), every major branch of the state was staffed
through the department level with military personnel. ^9 Rank had its
privileges: Flag officers (Generals and Admirals) were awarded cabinet and
sub-cabinet position (Ministers, Secretaries, and Under-secretaries) , while
upper-rank field grade officers (Colonels, Commodores, Majors, Captains) were
assigned positions down to the director of department level.
Control over lead agencies within the state apparatus, as well as
provincial governorships, ambassadorships, and all other high ranking posts,
were divided among the three branches of the armed forces. The Army assumed
most of the internal control agencies (including the Ministries of Labor and
Interior, the latter having jurisdiction over the Federal Police, customs,
internal revenue, and border control agencies, and a variety of specialized
intelligence units). The Navy took control of the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Social Welfare. The former was allocated to the Navy on the
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objective criteria that it had the most external orientation of the three
services. The latter, however, was awarded to the Navy because it had been
used by the Peronist regime as a major instrument for cultivating political
support, and had consequently become a bastion of patronage, political
favoritism, and corruption. As the most consistently anti-Peronist of the
armed forces, 60 the Navy asked for and received authority to undertake the
mission of drastically transforming the scope and character of the Ministry of
Social Welfare, which included the Secretariats of Housing, Public Health, and
Social Security. The Air Force, as the most politically neutral and profes-
sionally detached of the services, supervised the Ministry of Transportation.
In an effort to promote interservice cooperation, many posts within each
ministry and the provincial governments were further subdivided among the
different military forces. ^
As for the three branches of the Federal government, the legislature
was disbanded and the judiciary placed under military control. Consequently,
the role of the executive became paramount. As the branch under which all the
centralized administrative agencies, semi-autonomous entities, and public
enterprises were grouped, the executive was formally divided among the three
services in the form of the military junta of commanders-in-chief. The
presidency, however, was reserved for an Army officer, since he was the
representative of the largest service. Consequently, General Jorge Rafael
Videla was named to the presidency, which was also significant because the
main Argentine intelligence agency, SIDE (Servicio de Intelligencia del
Estado) was under the direct control of the Office of the President. Though
as elsewhere representatives of the other military branches were given posi-
tions within SIDE, it was the Army that controlled it during the "Proceso."
Most significant in terms of this essay is the fact that the sole branch
of the state controlled entirely by civilians during the "Proceso" was the
economic management branch, under the leadership of the Ministry of Economy.
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This included all non-military public enterprises, and the Secretariats of
Commerce, Finance, Industry, and Agriculture, as well as the Central Bank. As
such, the Ministry of Economy was the principal, when not sole articulator of
economic policy during this period. Both in that respect and in the broader
division of the state apparatus among the three military services, the
"Proceso" represented a considerable deepening over previous experiments in
bureaucratic-authoritarian rule such as that which had governed Argentina from
1966 to 1973. 62
This deepening was extended to the point where the Ministry of Economy
was placed under the control of a "liberal" economic team headed by former
Minister of Economy, Secretary of Agriculture, officer of the large land
owner's association (the Sociedad Rural Argentina), Business Council director,
and academician, Jose Martinez de Hoz (h) . More than a man of extensive
credentials, Martinez de Hoz "symbolized through his personal interests the
unity of agrarian, industrial, and financial concerns. "" As an heir to one
of Argentina's most well known landed aristocratic names, Martinez de Hoz also
demonstrated through his array of activities the tendency of the landed elite
to diversify its economic and political interests among a variety of sectors,
in order to ensure that their economic and political fortunes were not
exclusively tied to any one of them. 64 once Martinez de Hoz was installed,
this also ensured that their interests took precedence over all others within
the regime ' s economic program
.
This division of labor within the state apparatus was also felt in the
different levels of autonomy achieved. In the militarized branches responsible
for administering the exclusionary program, the degree of autonomy vis-a-vis
civil society was quite high. In the economic policy making branch, the level
of autonomy was quite low, as it became the exclusive domain of representatives
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of a narrow range of propertied interests. The "bi-frontal" levels of autonomy
exhibited by the state apparatus closely responded to the division of
exclusionary and inclusionary responsibilities within the regime. "^
The covergence of the military hierarchy with the agro-export and
transnational sectors responded to the fundamental logic of a shared
conceptualization of Argentine society and the evils that afflicted it. For
both the military hierarchy and the upper bourgeoisie, the roots of Argentina's
demise as a world power harked back to the advent of Peronism as a political
and social force in the mid-1940's. Consequently, the underlying premise of
their rule was a mutual dedication to the erradication of Peronism
as a social and political actor in Argentina, something that had been
repeatedly attempted without success since the overthrow of the first Peronist
regime in 1955.66 More importantly, this alliance presaged the return
— although this time in far more drastic and coercive fashion — to the
"orthodox" stabilization policies that had been tried, again without much
success, several times before. °7
As alluded to earlier, there was as well a shared conservative vision of
Argentine society on the part of these sectors that offered ideological, if
not moral substance to their proposed course of action. Joined on those
grounds by the Catholic Church hierarchy and conservative elements within
Peronism itself, the various components of the "Proceso" were deeply alarmed
by what they considered to be the deleterious effects of liberalism on
Argentine society. Drug addiction, vandalism, sexual license and perversion,
pornography, feminism, divorce, usury, and oncroaching Marxism — these and
other social pathologies were all attributed to the subversive influence of
the liberalized atmosphere that permeated society under the Peronist regime.
Comparisons with post-Franco Spain, Allende's Chile, and post-Salazar Portugal
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suggested to these groups that the chaos experienced by Argentine society in
the early seventies was nothing more than the natural outcome of a descent
into "libertinaje" or libertarianism. Hence, it was essential that the
"Proceso" firmly restore the traditional social hierarchies and sense of
values that had been the mainstay of Argentine life before the advent of
Peronism. It was this negative ideological vision that allowed the various
components of the "Proceso" to came together as a historical bloc, as they
forged a reactive collective identity that waxed nostalgic for an Argentina
that once was, but which had not been seen for several decades (since 1946, to
be precise)
.
The Church hierarchy's role as symbolic legitmator of the "Proceso"
should not be overlooked. Long an opponent of Peronism (remembering Peron's
assaults on, and eventual excommunication by the Church in the early 1950' s),
the conservative leaders of the Argentine Catholic Church were also decidedly
opposed to the progressive political activism espoused by many clerics under
the guise of liberation theology. Consequently, they were at the forefront of
those who saw moral decay as coterminous with increased democratization and
the secularization of the Church's traditional mission. Here again Gramsci's
diversification of the superstructure in relation to the base through his
notion of historical bloc is especially useful. It allows for the incorpora-
tion of this ostensibly non-class based group into the dominant coalition
that comprised the "Proceso" on (negative) ideological rather than strictly
material grounds (athough the propertied status of the Church should be
obvious), while at the same time retaining a fundamental understanding of the
regime's differentiated class content. It should be noted that non-Marxist
analysts have long pointed out the cross-cutting clevages and heterogeneous
coalitions at the heart of political conflict in Argentina. However, few of
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then have been able to shew how the confluence of such interests at a specific
moment can give rise to a particular form of authoritarian-capitalist
project. 68 once more, Gramsci's notions are illuminating for it is the nature
of the preceeding organic crisis - that is, the profound crisis that extended
from the economic base (the level of accumulation) through civil society and
political society into the heart of the state apparatus (the superstructural
levels at which social and political domination, if not hegemony, are
reproduced) — that in 1976 brought together these class and non-class actors
in a historical bloc that was far more than a political — or coup
— coalition.
Gramsci's emphasis on superstructural conditions help us understand the
particulars that brought together the "Proceso" as a historical bloc. Their
common fears went beyond economic concerns, and so did their goals. The latter
transcended any attampt to restructure Argentine capitalism, and included a
project of political and social restoration. Specifically, "if the economic
crisis was pointing towards a need to deepen the industrialization process, the
political crisis was pointing towards a need to tighten the politico-military
controls in order to maintain the existing relations of domination. . .
although there is always a strong interconnection between the economic and
political aspects of the crisis, the crisis which led to the establishment of
dictatorial controls was primarily political."69 That is to say, what made the
level of threat intolerable for the coup coalition was the deepening of the
crisis at the superstructural level. In any event, the issue for us to
consider here is that the Argentine Church hierarchy offered religious support
to the social and economic programs of the "Proceso," and implicitly justified
the "cleansing" use of state terror to achieve them.
For their part, the military hierarchy believed that "... the grave
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manifestations of violence, disorder, and conflict of the 1970 's were nothing
more than the product of a process of distortion within the national life be-
gun in 1946. These distortions — ideological, political, economic — (were
believed to be) contrary both to the security and natural potential of the
country. This perception led the armed forces to converge in program, and
partially in ideology, with the most hardline sectors of the traditional anti-
Peronist groups, sectors of the 'liberal' persuasion. "70
Upon assuming power, the "Proceso" proposed three main objectives: 1
)
erradicate Marxist subversion in all its forms from Argentine life; 2)
restructure and stabilize the national economy in a way that would eliminate
and prevent future disruptions of the productive process, and which would make
best use of those areas where Argentina enjoyed a competitive advantage in
the world capitalist market; and 3) having accomplished the first two
objectives, undertake a gradual, yet profound transformation of Argentine
society proper, in order to put an end to Peronism and other corrupting
influences that detracted from the traditional values of the nation. This
included the return to a situation of respect for traditional authority such
as the military and the Catholic Church, the elimination of corrupting
influences such as feminism, non-traditional religions, and "delinquent" art
forms, and the reassertion of the "proper" role of both men and women within
the family and society at large. 71 Only in this way, it was believed, could
the cancers afflicting Argentine society be entirely cured. Moreover,
because of the gravity of the situation, the medicine to be applied would of
necessity be harsh.
The perception of Argentine society as seriously ill and in desperate need
of a drastic cure was elevated to an economic level by the "liberals" who
assumed control of the economic branch. They believed that a market freed from
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external interference was the most efficient allocator or resources within
society. This belief went in hand with an individualistic political philosophy
that was opposed to state involvement in social life beyond narrowly defined
limits. Throughout the years preceeding the "Proceso," these individuals,
generally identified with the agro-export sector on personal and economic
grounds, maintained a position of strict opposition to the expansion of the
state's role as expressed through activities such as employment programs,
redistributive policies, extension of social welfare coverage, sectoral
development strategies, etc. They were most strongly opposed to the
state-sponsored drive towards industrial self-sufficiency that had begun in
response to the Depression and World War Two, and which had received its
largest boost, along with the afore-mentioned social programs, during the
first Peronist regime of 1946-1955.^2
Their diagnosis of the economic situation at the time they assumed control
of the economic management branch was therefore explained as follows: The
major reason the Argentine economy stagnated was the distortion of relative
domestic prices caused by the industrialization program and expansion of the
state. That is, the introduction of import tariffs created a protective wall
that allowed for the rise and subsequent consolidation of inefficient domestic
industries, in parallel, the agro-export sector, which was the repository of
the natural competitive advantages of the country, was discriminated against
(via export taxes and domestic price controls) in order to serve demagogic,
although inefficient policies of income redistribution. To this were added
the monopolistic practices of a corporative labor movement that conspired with
the industrial bourgeoisie to structurally adjust prices to costs behind the
tariff barriers. This made it possible for them to agree on wages and prices,
which created a structural tendency towards inflation and low productivity.
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Successive governments, finally, wasted resources on an inflated public
bureaucracy, inefficient public enterprises, and in the maintenance of a huge,
costly, and deteriorated social welfare system. 73
With this diagnosis made, the economic team offered the following
prescription: 1 ) reduce real wages by at least forty percent relative to
those of the previous five years; 2) eliminate taxes on agricultural exports;
3) progressively reduce import tariffs; 4) eliminate subsidies to non-
traditional (i.e. industrial) exports; 5) eliminate deficient social
services such as health and housing, sectoral promotion credits, and raise
prices for all public services; 6) liberalize the exchange and finance
markets; and 7) reduce public expenditures, employment, and the deficit by
reorganizing the state apparatus (along more narrow lines) and by
"re-privatizing" state enterprises. 74
Before continuing discussion of the economic program, mention must be made
of the fact that the gap between theory and practice, especially in the
economic realm, has seldom been bridged in modern Argentina. Many different
political and economic projects were attempted and failed prior to the
"Proceso," and to a great degree this was a fate shared by the economic program
adopted in 1976. In particular, the highly speculative practices adopted by
various economic sectors (which came to be known on the streets as "La
Calesita," or "the Merry-Go-Round") in response to the overvaluation of the
peso led to massive capital flight, escalating interest rates, and a wave of
bankrupcies among domestic financial institutions. By mid-1981 the national
economy was approaching the levels of decline witnessed in 1975 and 1976. As
shall be explained in more detail further on, this economic crisis and other
complementary factors marked the beginning of the regime's unraveling. The
basic point to be underscored, though, is that this project was very precise
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about what it proposed to do, and who would have to bear the costs involved in
its implementation. Its eventual failure stemmed not from the response of
these sectors (the domestic bourgeoisie and working classes), but from the
practices of those it was designed to benefit (particularly the financial
elites). Even so, it held together very well for at least three years, only to
react very adversely to the global recession of 1979-1981 . Moreover, whatever
its eventual outcome, the gap between economic theory and practice did not
hinder the use of state terror as a complement to the economic program,
especially because the regime's social objectives required its systanatic use as
well.
Ultimately, what this economic program was proposing to do was more than
stabilize the economy. Stabilization implies returning to the normal state of
affairs after a period of abnormality. This project sought to reverse the
thirty five year logic of industrialization that had preceeded it, and
"dismantle the productive structure erected as of the 193 O's" in order to
restore Argentina to its proper place as a "preindustrial country. "^^ To this
end, "the traditional program of the agrarian bourgeoisie appeared to be the
most appropriate for radically changing the Argentina economic structure.
"
7 °
Reaffirmation of this "liberal" economic outlook that championed the notion
that Argentina had a competitive advantage in agro-exports was provided by the
objective criteria of rising international prices for basic food products and in
the incidence of famine (particularly in the Horn of Africa) during the early
seventies. These external factors buttressed "liberal" arguments that the
agro-export and agro-industrial sectors were the only productive activity that
could objectively improve Argentina's position in the international economic
market. 77 As Martinez de Hoz explained it, "the problem of the world food
shortage will be one of the most important confronting humanity over the next
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few years. . . just as the oil exporting nations have beccme powerful in the
international scene, so then will the countries that export food find themselves
in the not so distant future in a similar position of predominance within the
world concert of nations. "78
The prescription of Martinez de Hoz and his "liberal" colleagues was
awarded further credence by the prestige associated with one of the foremost
practicioners of this economic philosophy, Milton Friedman, and by the fact that
his policies (as more specificially translated and applied by Arnold Harberger
and his cadre of University of Chicago-trained economists) were being followed
with apparent success by the military regime in neighboring Chile. Despite
its specific differences vis-a-vis the Chilean model, all of this made the
"liberal" program seem eminently rational and objectively advisable, which
allowed them to justify the use of coercive measures in pursuit of their
economic ends.
For the military hierarchy, the "liberal" economic program provided a form
of theoretical cement that justified brutal reassertion of its traditional
authority over civil society. It offered a technical rationale for using state
terror as a means of altering the nation's historic memory by restructuring
class relations, since a highly exclusionary approach towards subordinate social
groups was required for the re-pastoralization of the economy. The economic
turning back of the clock consequently provided a structural foundation for
reducing the social arena along historically traditional, pre-Peronist lines.
Military enforced societal discipline, hence, was required in order to re-impose
the traditional class hierarchy and authority lines that constituted the social
parameters which, complementing the "liberal" economic project, were the basis
of this nostalgic vision.
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Opening the Argentine domestic market was expected to stimulate industrial
efficiency via increased international competition. It was believed that
agro-industries such as food processing, meat packing, and cereal refineries
would experience the most growth, as would related industries such as fishing
enterprises, leather and textile manufacturers, etc. On the other hand, heavily
subsidized industries such as those involved in consumer durables and heavy
manufacturing would be eliminated by foreign competition, which would decrease
the financial burden on the public sector. To this would be added the
elimination of many social services and the transfer of state enterprises to
private hands. Coupled with the freeing of prices (including agricultural
products) within the domestic market, these measures were deemed necessary for
restoring some sense of order to the Argentine economy.
However, in a country that had a thirty five year history of sustained
industrialization, an extensive public sector providing a wide range of goods
and services, and very large and well organized urban industrial classes,
particularly the domestic bourgeoisie and the organized labor movement, this
required that severe coercive measures be applied in order to prevent their
interference with the free operation of the market. For that reason, this
economic model has also came to be known, somewhat erroneously, as a form of
"market Fascism." 7 ^ in order to fully understand the scope of this project, we
must briefly describe some of the structural conditions that it was confronted
with.
In Argentina, a historically low birth rate has led to a relative scarcity
of labor, which has contributed throughout its history to a low rate of
unemployment. 80 As a result, labor unions in labor-intensive sectors enjoyed
disporportionate strength, since there was no reserve labor pool to draw from in
order to avoid meeting their demands. Most of the labor force, and their
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institutional representatives, were concentrated in those industries built up
during the state-sponsored industrialization drive, and in the public sector, be
it the centralized state apparatus, state enterprises, or quasi-public entities.
The economic program adopted by the "Proceso" was therefore oriented towards
breaking the power of the unions, which was considered a vital step towards
eliminating Peronism as an economic and political force (since the vast majority
of the organized labor movement was Peronist)
.
The opening of the domestic market was designed to eliminate those very
industries in which the unions had greatest strength. It also punished the
"traitorous" domestic entrepreneurs who had allied themselves with the
Peronists in previous years. Elimination of these industries would create a
large pool of unemployed who could then be used as a reserve labor force with
which to break the power of the unions in other economic sectors. Moreover,
elimination of industries in which the unions were strong displaced labor to the
service and agro-industrial sectors in which they were relatively weak. The
more individualized forms of work in the service and agrarian sectors also
helped break the sense of collective identity of the working classes, a fact
that was reinforced by the elimination of union social service programs and
public services expressly oriented towards them. The lowering of import
barriers and overvaluation of the peso thus not only fostered competition within
the Argentine market, it was also an initial step in the move to diminish the
collective strength of the lower industrial classes. Obviously enough, these
classes were not about to witness their own destruction without resistance. With
this in mind, and given the paralyzing effects of guerrilla activities and
high levels of labor mobilization prior to the March, 1976 coup, state terror
was consequently deemed to be an essential complement to the regime's economic
program.
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Regrettably, it is impossible within the context of this essay to delve
further into the details of this exclusionary "liberal" economic program,
oarticularly the causes and consequences of its ultimate failure. Since our
interest is focused on the various faces of dominio , and particularly the
differentiated use of state terror as a complement to economic and social
policy, the reader is advised to examine the specific evaluations of the
economic measures implemented by the "Proceso" available elsewhere. °* The major
point to be underscored with regard to the economic program is that it
contained a number of overlapping objectives that made the recourse to state
terror all the more advisable (in the eyes of those responsible for implementing
it) in order to ensure full achievement of each of them. At a social level, the
economic program sought to re-establish the dominance of the traditional landed
and transnational sectors over the domestic bourgeoisie and organized working
classes that had enjoyed the favor of the preceeding Peronist regime, and which
had been challenging that dominance since the advent of Peronism in the
mid-1940' s. To do so, the "Proceso" proposed to reverse the industry-oriented
strategy in vogue since the 193 O's, and re-emphasize that area where Argentina
was believed to hold its most natural competitive advantage: the agro-export
sector and its attendant infrastructural and secondary industries. This was to
be done by opening the domestic market to foreign competition, expanding export
opportunities for primary goods, reducing the role of the state in both the
productive process in general and in the provision of basic goods and services
in particular, and by allowing the price of agricultural products destined for
export and home consumption to be determined by the international market.
These measures were taken in order to eliminate inefficient domestic
industries and state activities where the lower bourgeoisie and organized
labor were concentrated, which would displace labor towards less unionized and
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more traditional industries related to agriculture. By doing so, not only
would the position of the agro-export sector be enhanced; the economic and
political strength of the domestic bourgeoisie and organized labor would be
permanently broken as well, which was the first step towards reestablishing
the "natural" hierarchy among socio-economic classes that had been so
seriously disrupted by the generalized disorder that characterized the period
of organic crisis preceeding the military coup d'etat of March, 1976.
In effect, it was the convergence of a particular social and economic
outlook that caused the "Proceso" to reject the structuralist critiques made
fashionable by ECLA theoreticians in the 1940' s and 1950 's (to say nothing of
Marxist-based dependency analyses), and which had sustained the
industrialization programs adopted by the military-bureaucratic regimes in
Brazil and Chile, as well as that of the previous Argentine experiment with
military-bureaucratic authoritarianism from 1966 to 1973. Instead, the unique
obstacles posed by the Peronist movement — especially its socio-economic bases,
ideological orientation, organizational strength, and mobilizational ability
— required an economic, political, and social strategy that would diminish
Peronism as a force at all three levels. It was this conservative project,
coupled with the afore-mentioned objective rationales for adopting a strategy
that stressed Argentina's area of competitive advantage in the world economy,
that caused the "Proceso" to diverge with respect to other military-bureaucratic
economic programs in the Southern Cone. More importantly, it was this
overarching objective which made the recourse to state terror an integral part
of the regime's program, and which gave it a differentiated class content.
Given the severity of the preceeding social crisis, the scope of the
regime's project, and the organizational strength of the groups to be
subordinated and excluded, it becomes readily apparent why the systematic use of
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terror was deemed vital for the success of the "Proceso." It is to the various
forms in which state terror was manifest, especially as they related to the
economic and social programs, that we now turn.
VT. The Varied Faces of State Terror .
Within days of the golpe , all political parties and activities were out-
lawed. Basic legal rights (habeus corpus, right to be formally charged and
receive a fair trial, etc.) were suspended. All labor unions (including the
national labor federation, the Confederacion General de Trabajo or CGT) and
the small businessman's association (the Confederacion General Economica or
CGE) were declared illegal as well, and their headquai ters, social and welfare
facilities, and financial resources placed under military control.
Strikes, slow downs, lock outs, and other actions that impeded productivity
were declared to be crimes against national security punishable by long prison
sentences. ^2 Collective bargaining was abolished, and a strict wage freeze in
all sectors, as outlined earlier, was imposed. As a result, by late 1976 real
wages had dropped an average of more than fifty percent relative to the last
year of the Peronist regime, and worker 1 s share of the national income
declined from 48.5 percent to just 29 percent. By 1981, this figure had only
risen slightly above 30 percent, and real wages continued at levels half those
of six years before. 83 jn effect, the "rules of the game" were altered by
closing the legal modes of access, redress, and representation normally used
by the domestic bourgeoisie and organized labor movement to defend their
interests and press their demands. Thus forced into institutional silence,
these classes saw their material standard of living drop dramatically as
domestic prices rose and their purchasing power diminished under the regime's
exclusionary economic policies.
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This was compounded by the "rationalization" of the state apparatus
undertaken by the regime after it assumed power. Using a principle known
as the "subsidiarity of the state," a broad range of agencies were either
compressed, eliminated, or transferred to the private sector, and their
personnel similarly displaced or dismissed. A major instrument used to this
effect by the "rationalization" program was a law that authorized dismissal
of employees without indemnization or warning for reasons of "service,"
"national security," or "redundancy."^ Most of those fired on these
grounds were union activists, such as in the case of 300 state utility workers
fired en masse in mid-1976. ^5 gy 1980, the regime claimed to have eliminated
more than 200,000 employees from the public payroll.^ Paralleling these
reductions in the public work force were similar decreases in industrial
employment, which was a product of the wave of bankrupcies among local
enterprises that resulted from the opening of the domestic market to foreign
competition. From 1975 to 1981 industrial employment decreased 26.9
percent." Overall, industrial output declined 24 percent relative to the
1974 level, and a full ten percent of the industrial work force (800,000
people) were without jobs by 1981.^8 Conversely, the agricultural sector
maintained the moderate growth levels of previous years. ^9 The areas that did
see growth, as forseen, were the financial and agro-industrial sectors. 90
Elimination of collective bargaining not only facilitated the drop in
wage levels. It also prevented workers from having a voice in determining
work conditions (which, among other things, resulted in the regime increasing
the minimum work week form 36 to 42 hours), allowed for increased salary
differences among categories of workers, and prevented the domestic bourgeoisie
from reaching wage agreements with the unions that would have undermined the
regime's economic program. 91 Along with the outlawing of strikes and other
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union activities, direct military control of union facilities and resources,
massive firings, and the displacement of labor to more individualized or less
extensively unionized activities, this was designed to break the collective
identity and sense of spiritual affinity of the social classes that were the
lifeblood of the Peronist movement. 92 Specifically, with these measures the
"Proceso" hoped to eliminate the strength of these groups on four distinct, yet
interrelated levels: i.e. as economic, corporative, social, and political
actors. 93
To accomplish this, a new Law of Professional Associations was passed that
attempted to disarticulate the basic union structure that had existed under the
previous regime. 94 Among other provisions, it outlawed the existing national
labor federation (the CG7T), and allowed for multiple unions per industry, level
of activity, sector, and region. This was designed to break the vertical
structure that was the organizational backbone of the Peronist-dcminated labor
movement. The new trade union law placed all union activities under strict
regulations closely supervised by the Ministry of Labor, which was controlled by
the Army. In addition, the Registry of Employer's Associations, which had been
the institutional referent for small businesses within the Ministry of Economy,
was transferred to the Ministry of Labor as a department-level dependency of the
National Directorate of Professional Associations. 95
The significance of this last move derives from the fact it shifted
oversight responsibility for an employer's institutional referent to the
jursidiction of the agency responsible for administering organized labor
interests. More importantly, it meant that this referent was being removed
from the economic policy-making branch (where it had institutional access to
the policy-making process) and placed in a control agency responsible for
regulating the activities of groups further down the productive ladder.
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Coupled with the disbanding of its organizational representative (the CGE),
this measure formally marked the exclusion of the domestic bourgeoisie as an
economic and political actor. With regard to the labor movement, this
objective was made explicit by then-Secretary of Industry Juan Alemann, who
said "with thes^ policies we attempt to weaken the enormous power of the
syndicates. . . (because) Argentina used to have a syndical power that was too
strong. . . (By). . . weakening it we have created the basis for a future
political opening. "96 in effect, at an economic, organizational, political,
and ultimately social level, the "Proceso" systematically excluded the domestic
bourgeoisie and organized working classes. ^7
To the anti-organizational measures and economic constraints were added
other subtle coercive restrictions designed to reduce the power of the
excluded classes. Ceilings on public transportation rates and rent controls
were lifted, which effectively dislocated large sectors of the working
population. Rigid standards of appearance and dress were imposed in the work
place, at school, and on the street. Failure to comply with these standards,
even if forced to do so for economic reasons, often resulted in dismissal or
arrest. Applications for employment were scrutinized by security personnel in
order to determine "subversive" backgrounds, including labor activism. A
similar procedure was instituted in many schools, particularly those located in
or near working class districts. Rationalizing that, in the reputed words of
the military governor of Buenos Aires, General Iberico Saint Jean, "subversion
begins in culture and in education, " a general clampdcwn on these activities was
effected. Censorship of the media was universal, and bans on all literature,
arts, and other forms of expression considered to be "subversive" were enacted.
This included the works of Althusser, Freud, Marx, Lacan, Foucault, Neruda,
Cortazar, Garcia Marquez, and Upton Sinclair, among others. The educational
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system was overhauled in order to rid it of "class-oriented," so-called "secular
humanist, " and other "subversive" subjects, and to restablish the primacy of
traditional Catholic values. Psychoanalysis, sociology, and political science
were eliminated frcm many university curriculums on the grounds that they were
Marxist sciences. Students and faculty suspected of harboring subversive
tendencies were expelled, and often arrested. 98
It is possible that the military's attempt to reconstitute the fabric of
these ideological apparatuses of reproduction (schools, the media, etc.) was
part of a larger hegemonic project designed to reassert over the long term the
convergent values, mores, and beliefs of the conservative military hierarchy and
its civilian allies. What is significant is that this project, if it indeed
existed, ultimately proved unsuccessful because it failed to understand two
simple facts about hegemony. First, the objective conditions for achieving
hegemony, that is, as an economic and political quid pro quo constituted by a
mixture of consent and concessions, should ideally be present before the conquest
of political power. 99 since this was clearly not the case (and in fact was a
precipitating factor in the golpe ) by definition the "Proceso" could initially
be no more than an exercise in dcminio
,
regardless of its pretentions.
Second, in marked contrast to other cases in which the conquest of
political power preceeded the achievement of hegemony (postwar Italy and West
Germany, among others), the "Proceso" was unable or uninterested in making the
constructive changes necessary for the achievement of hegemony. Beyond the
restrictions placed on various ideological apparatuses, there was no attempt to
create legitimate political vehicles or engage the corporate concessions
necessary for the establishment of a basic quid pro quo with subordinate groups.
Oriented towards its cleansing mission, the "Proceso" made no attempt to win the
consent of the subordinate groups, and in fact sought to systematically close all
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avenues of societal expression (as potential feedback loops). This reduced what
had once been a (admittedly fractious) political and economic dialogue between
contending socioeconomic actors to a coercive monologue on the part of those in
power. Thus, without the corporative changes necessary for the establishment of
a hegemonic project as a follow to the period of domination, the "Proceso" was
never capable of instilling in its subjects the legitimacy of its social and
political vision, regardless of the measures it took to restructure various
ideological apparatuses. In other words, the "Proceso" may have desired to be
hegemonic; in fact, it was not.
Whatever the purpose, the militarization of the state apparatus
complemented these authoritarian measures. Instead of social workers or
professionals in various public service fields, those who sought the assistance
of public agencies were confronted by military personnel interested in locating
subversives and their sympathizers. This was especially evident in the Ministry
of Social Welfare, where Navy officers took a particularly dim view of the
"parasitic" tendencies of the lower classes. A similar situation occurred in
the previously union-operated welfare agencies (Obras Sociales), which saw their
resources and property transferred to the Army-controlled Ministry of Labor.
Two areas that witnessed the promulgation of subtle coercive measures in
systematic fashion were public health and social security, both located under
the jurisdiction of the Navy-controlled Ministry of Social Welfare. On a
general plane, the amount of financial resources to these sectors was cut by
more than half in the period 1976-1981 . 10° At the same time, the total number
of beds provided by public hospitals decreased by more than 25 percent. *Q*
Military expropiation of the union-operated social welfare network, including
the union-affiliated hospitals that provided a major portion of the coverage for
the organized working classes, furthered the curtailment of basic social
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services. Public hospitals were ordered to charge fees for basic diagnosis and
treatment, the first time this had ever occurred. In lieu of the union social
security programs, private retirement plans were offered at rates far above
those of the unions. This effectively excluded a large portion of the labor
movement from both types of coverage. 102
As if these general restrictive measures were not enough, there were even
more sinister applications of this type of coercion. Public hospitals and
medical attention facilities in working class neighborhoods were systematically
closed, most often on the grounds that there was a scarcity of demand.
Simultaneously, people were turned away from those that remained open (often
after lengthy trips to reach them) on the grounds that there was an excess of
demand, or because they could not afford the basic service charge demanded for
what once had been free. Many hospitals were placed under the control of
military doctors, who were more concerned with monitoring the patient population
for possible subversives rather than for signs of disease. Union affiliation,
either directly or as a relative of a union member, was often used as grounds
for denial of service.
Not surprisingly, disease and mortality rates among the working class
population increased dramatically under the "Proceso." 10^ At the same time,
price controls on basic medical products were lifted, and regulations
governing the fabrication and dispensation of medicine were relaxed, which
forced the least-advantaged sectors of the population to use more expensive
and inferior (when not ineffectual) medical products in an effort to seek
relief.
More generally, the National Integrated Health Plan established by the
Peronist regime to ensure comprehensive medical coverage for the entire
population was repealed. In its place were offered a number of private health
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plans established by profit-oriented medical enterprises and insurance
agencies. However, the detrimental effects of the regime's economic program
on working class incomes made it impossible to afford private coverage. In
turn, the domestic bourgeoisie saw a greater part of their income directed
towards medical attention, which had an adverse impact on their material
standard of living. In effect, the "Proceso" removed the minimum health and
welfare floors previously provided by the state as a form of punishment for
those groups it believed to be the causes of the Argentine malaise. Both
materially and physiologically, this meant that the domestic bourgeoisie and
organized working classes were made to pay a heavy price as a consequence of
their economic, oolitical, and social exclusion.
The excluded sectors initially attempted to resist the moves against
them. In 1976 and 1977, for example, there were over 500 hundred strikes and
numerous other protests called against the regime's economic policies. '"4
Likewise, certain parts of the media voiced concern over the scope and
direction of the repressive campaign. '05 iphe answer to these and all other
forms of dissent, and which came to identify the "Proceso" as unprecedented ly
brutal, was an extremely high level of violence. Though this violence touched
all sectors of the population, it was most harshly felt by the groups that
were viewed as antagonistic or "culpable" by the regime.
If the economic exclusion, political and organizational restrictions, and
denial of basic public services represented the rational, systematic, and more
subtle coercive aspects of the "liberal" prescription for transforming Argentine
society, then the "dirty war" against subversion represented an emotional,
cathartic venting of accumulated rage on the part of the military hierarchy and
its civilian allies against those held responsible for the national decline.
Hence, no rules of war, much less civility, conditioned the unleashing of the
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repressive apparatus. The end — erradication of subversion — justified any
means taken on its behalf . Yet here too, the campaign of state terror was both
rational and systematic.
The armed forces began the active part of the state terror campaign by
consolidating their hold on society by militarily defeating the guerrillas in
the northern provinces in 1976-1977, and by simultaneously occupying all major
cities and towns. Curfews were declared, restrictions on pedestrian and
vehicular traffic imposed (particularly near government and military
installations), massive identification checks were instituted, and random
searches of individuals and raids on public areas and private property were
conducted frequently and without warning. Factories and schools were occupied
by military personnel looking for subversives, assemblies of more than a dozen
people for non-family or non-government sanctioned reasons were prohibited, and
soldiers patrolled the streets, where they were allowed to enforce these
security measures as they deemed fit. These were, in the words of
Nobel Laureate Adolfo Perez-Esguivel, "troops of occupation within their own
country."
It was in the activities of para-military death squads, however, where the
climate of terror was most energetically sowed, and where it reached its most
vicious expression. Some of these squads were odd mixtures of civilian and
military personnel — most notably the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (the
infamous "Triple-A"), which had been organized under the previous regime by
right-wing Peronists under the leadership of former Social Welfare Minister Jose
Lopez Rega. Most, however, were more formally connected to the state by virtue
of their being specialized branches of existing military or intelligence units.
Be they formally or informally attached to the state, these decentralized groups
of a half-dozen heavily armed men, always using aliases or noms de guerre,
44
operated with nearly complete autonomy and in highly amorphous, overlapping
jurisdictions. Along with those of the military high command, each service
branch, military district, police district, and police station had its own
"operative" group. Working day and night out of unmarked cars and trucks (mostly
government-issue Ford Falcons), these groups would kidnap from virtually any
location — at home, school, in restaurants, theaters, even churches
— individuals previously targeted by the various intelligence services as
suspect. Often, passers-by or family members witness to the abductions would be
kidnapped as well, or later, when they went to report them.
The abducted would first be taken to local detention centers, where they
were physically tortured via beatings, electric shock, prolonged immersion in
rancid water, excrement, or other vile liquids, burning, mutilation, rape, and
attacks by trained dogs. They would also be psychologically tortured in
the form of forced denial of sleep, exposure to the torture of other prisoners
(often their own relatives), and by being subject to prolonged periods of
isolation and sensory deprivation, extreme temperature and noise levels,
various combinations thereof, and by simulated executions.^"
While many individuals found innocent or guilty of minor infractions
gained their freedom eventually, many others were subsequently transferred to
the secret detention centers operated by the different services, SIDE, and the
Federal Police. Some of the more notorious sites were located at the Naval
Mechanics School (ESMA) in Buenos Aires (headquarters of the Naval Intelligence
Service (SIN) and the Intelligence Task Forces), the Army installations located
at Campo de Mayo outside of the capital (where Intelligence Batallion 601 was
based), and at the Federal Police barracks on the road to the international
airport of Ezeiza. Dozens of other centers were located around the country,
especially in and around the industrial cities of Cordoba and Rosario. Once in
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these centers, the prisoners would again be subjected to various combinations of
torture while being interrogated, often under the supervision of military
doctors who determined their pain tolerance and threshold levels. There were
even specialists in different types of torture such as the infamous "crow" or
"white angel of death," Lieutenant Carlos Astiz of the Naval Mechanics School,
who gained notoriety for his grim enthusiasm and callousness, and a penchant for
"turning" prisoners by sexually assaulting and torturing women and children in
front of their families (and who subsequently became better known for being the
commander of the Argentine force that invaded the South Georgia Islands, thereby
starting the Falkland/ Malvinas conflict). '"'
After an indefinite period of incarceration without any formal charge
having been brought against them, most of these prisoners were killed, either by
summary execution or by being sedated, loaded onto aircraft, and dumped out over
remote areas and the Atlantic Ocean. Recently, soldiers involved in these
dumpings have come forth to reveal that hundreds of victims were disposed of in
this and other similarly gruesome — and systematic — fashions. '"8
To cement the bonds of loyalty (and culpability) tying them together, all
members of these squads were required to directly involve themselves in the
torture and murder of suspects. In some cases, blood pacts were confirmed
by summarily executing prisoners in front of the rest of the squad, as was the
case with military officers in the "Sun of May" (Sol de Mayo) lodge then
operating in Cordoba.
Although the exact figures have yet to be determined, about 10 thousand
people died at the hands of these military and para-military groups, 15 to
30,000 disappeared after being abducted and are presumed dead, and another
25,000 were subjected to torture before being released. In contrast, leftist
guerrilla and terrorist groups killed less that 5,000 people before being
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defeated. At most, only twenty percent of those victimized by right-wing death
squads and military forces were actively involved in Marxist subversion; the
rest were not directly involved with terrorist or guerrilla groups. Nor do the
ramifications of the "dirty war" end with the acknowledgement of excesses that
led to the disappearance of innocents. During the past couple of years a number
of children of "disappeared" persons have been found in adoptive homes, in many
cases those of military personnel or located abroad. Rather than the excesses
of an over-zealous few (as the military leaders maintained it was), the "dirty
war" provided the framework in which the regime's social transformation project
could begin. In this regard, it was a deliberate, extensive, and systematic
process of societal subjugation.
It is Gramsci who once again allows us to gain perspective on these
paramilitary activities. "In the present struggles. . ."he wrote . . . "it
often happens that a weakened State machine is like a flagging army: commandos,
or private armed organizations, enter the field to accomplish two tasks — to
use illegality, while the State appears to remain within legality, and thereby
to reorganize the State itself." 1 ^ That is to say, these paramilitary groups
(in Gramsci' s time incarnate in the souadristi of the Fascist movement) are ". .
. not against the State, but aligned with it. " 1 ^ (-) By allowing right-wing
paramilitary death squads to roam freely and act with impunity, and by
disavowing any formal connection with them (claiming instead that they were
either opposed factions within leftist terrorist organizations or anonymous
groups of patriotic anti-communists avenging earlier losses to the left), the
military leaders of the "Proceso" could continue to justify the need for the
legal restrictions on political and other forms of social activity as a means of
consolidating the superordinate authority of the state in the face of these
external threats. This also permitted them to restructure the state apparatus
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and implorient the more subtle coercive measures deemed essential by the
"liberal" theoreticians for the fundamental transformation of Argentine
society.
Who then, were the bulk of those victimized by the "active" part of the
state terror campaign? Not surprisingly, the majority of the victims of the
"dirty war" came from among the excluded social groups. Forty percent of
all those "disappeared" were trade union activists and union members. Nineteen
percent came from other occupations that were directly connected in one way or
another with the excluded groups, particularly journalists, medical doctors,
and teachers.^ The ronainder were for the most part students. Again, the
vast majority of these people were not directly connected with guerrilla or
terrorist groups.
The extent of the terror campaign against organized labor is well
summarized by Francisco Delich: "(Union) leaders and activists were killed,
disappeared, imprisoned, and exiled. . . they numbered in the thousands.
There were executions in the factories, and physical and psychological
violence designed to terrorize the workers. "112 Because of these actions, many
union members were forced to quit their jobs in order to save themselves. ^^
As mentioned earlier, strikes and other forms of protest were physically
supressed, most often by sending troops into the factories, where they beat
and arrested leaders and forced the rest of the workers back to the job. 1 14
Many times, as in the case of Public Utility Worker's Union president Oscar
Smith, vocal protest resulted in permanent "disappearance." Most of the union
members who disappeared or were imprisoned came from traditionally strong
Peronist unions with histories of politization and activism, such as the
Metalworkers, Autoworkers, Mechanics, Textile, and Public Transportation
unions. ' 3 The regime's reach even extended to union activities overseas, such
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as in the case of the dismissal and intimidation of union members of the
national airline (Aereolineas Argentinas) working in the United States. ^^
While less extensive than the campaign against organized labor (since the
domestic bourgeoisie was less organized and ideologically united as a group),
state terror was selectively applied against the subordinate fractions of the
bourgeoisie in order to preclude their interference with the economic program.
Leaders of the outlawed CGE were arrested and held for indefinite periods,
others were forced into exile, and many were the targets of death threats,
beatings, and other intimidate ry acts. One particularly nasty aspect of the
state terror applied against the domestic bourgeoisie was the use of
anti-semitism. While Jews occupied a significant position within this class,
they received a disporportionately high amount of the terror meted out against
it. This was particularly true of Jewish merchants living or working in the
Province of Buenos Aires, which was under the control of a faction in the Army
that had well-known Fascist sympathies, and who viewed the decline of Western
civilization as part of an insidious plot on the part of a global
Marxist-Zionist conspiracy. ^ ^
At another level, intellectuals not linked to the regime became the
target of an intense ideological examination that was designed to locate and
weed out those with Marxist beliefs. Many professions — journalism,
psychoanalysis, and law in particular — witnessed whole-scale purges. Moral
and ideological censorship covered the full spectrum of creative endeavor,
which significantly curtailed intellectual growth and diminished the free flow
of information in society. Furtive activity, especially reading and writing
between the lines, consequently became the primary creative focus within civil
society.
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The economic program also took its toll. Thousands of Argentines
emmigrated into voluntary economic exile in order to escape the adverse effects
the "liberal" prescription had on domestic industries and small businesses.
Economic self-preservation, in other words, dictated the necessity of moving
abroad to a large fraction of the domestic bourgeoisie, particularly those with
technical skills. Thus, although relatively selective when compared to the
coercion directed against the labor movement, this varied application of state
terror had its desired effect. The subordinate fractions of the bourgeoisie were
divided, exiled, and/or cowered into acquiescent silence or opportunistic
support for the regime.
The application of state terror had a dramatic impact on the whole of
Argentine society, but particularly on the excluded social groups. The
magnitude and intensity of the coercive campaign, in all of its guises,
significantly altered the basic forms of interaction among members of these
groups. On the one hand, in Gramsci's words, the "Proceso" "juridically
abolished even the modern forms of autonomy of the subordinate classes (such as)
parties, trade unions, and cultural associations," and sought to "incorporate
them into the activity of the State: (this was) the legal centralization of all
national life in the hands of the ruling group. . ."''8 it is this concerted
attempt to eliminate potentially (counter) hegemonic apparatuses that serves as
a distinguishing characteristic of exercises in dcminio such as the "Proceso."
On the other hand, at an individual level the "active" part of the state
terror campaign imposed a degree of fear that affected the basic textures of
sociability within the excluded groups. Those who comprised these groups
— that is, individual working class and lower middle class people — were not
only divorced from the sources of power, but also deprived of basic rights and
subjected to the continual violence of those who held power. The notion of
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social power, at least as it was manifest in identification and participation
with collective groups, became an alien concept for each of these individuals.
Thus, rather than engage a political and economic dialogue between rulers and
ruled, members of the excluded, subordinate groups were subjected to a highly
coercive monologue on the part of the "Proceso" that was designed to isolate
than as individuals and alienate then from their fellow class members.
There was, in essence, a systanatic disruption, de- composition, or
subordination to the state of basic collective identities under the "Proceso,
"
in which members of the excluded groups were forcibly aliented by overwhelming
fear frcm their peers. Group identification, as a primary reason for individual
victimization, was abandoned in favor of isolation and non-participation. This
was most evident in the generalized attitude of "no te metas, " or "don't get
involved" that characterized Argentine society during this period. Such
alientation lay at the core, and yet was a product of the process of
de-socialization and identity regression that was produced by the pervasive
atmosphere of fear. It was, in effect, an "infantilization" of each individual
member of the excluded groups. Isolated, frightened, powerless, and with no
recognizable rights, the individual was deprived of the basic attributes of a
mature social being. ^-^
It was this "infantilization" of individual members of the exluded groups
that was the ultimate goal of the "Proceso, " because it ensured the fundamental
rupture of the collective identities of those who were believed to stand in the
^ay of the transformation of Argentine society, and who were held mainly
responsible for the organic crisis that had brought Argentina to the brink of
collapse. In a sense, the entire society was reduced to the level of a child's
nightmare: better obey, comply, and behave, or "te van a agarrar los
icmbres del Falcon," that is, the men in the Ford Falcons would get you. 120 jn
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a very real sense, during the "Proceso" civil society reverted to its most
primitive form along with the state apparatus.
VTI. The Phases of Authoritarian Domination
Although it lies beyond the scope of this essay, before concluding we must
briefly consider the different phases of the "Proceso." In contrast to the
long-term orientation of hegemonic regimes, regimes based exclusively on
domination are inherently short-lived. This is because physical force, be it in
the form of state terror or more conventional repression, tends to obey a form
of Newtonian law, i.e. it tends to dissipate with prolonged use, and therefore
wanes over time when i_ is the primary basis of rule. Above all, it is the
absence of a hegemonic project to take up where domination leaves off that is a
hallmark of dcminio , and is what gives it an inherently short-term character.
As such, it is possible to distinguish three general phases in the tenure
of these regimes. First comes the phase when the regime is strongest, is able
to consolidate its hold on civil society, impose its programs and policies, and
structure social relations through the use (and fear of use) of force, including
state terror. This phase, which can be called that of regime consolidation and
program implementation, has been the focus of this analysis of the "Proceso."
The second phase, in which internal and external contradictions and
pressures cause the regime to waver, can be labeled the period of regime crisis
and unraveling. For the "Proceso," this period spanned the months between
March, 1981 and April, 1982. As mentioned earlier, by that time the economy had
experienced a marked downturn. The era of "plata dulce" (sweet money) and
speculation had been replaced with an acute and growing fiscal crisis that
threatened to bring the productive process to a standstill. It coincided with
the succession crisis that accompanied President Videla's retirement in March
1981. This so-called "Achilles Heel" (as O'Donnell accurately calls it) of
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military-bureaucratic authoritarian regimes was especially so in the case of the
"Proceso," for the coincidence of economic downturn and executive succession
forced the regime to undergo a none-too-flattering self-evaluation. That led to
nine months of increasingly bitter factional in-fighting between the moderate
and hard-line sectors of the military hierarchy. Initially, the moderates won
out, and installed one of their own (General Eduardo Viola) as president. He
promptly embarked on an economic program that attempted to reverse some of the
de-industrializing trends in the national economy, and, in parallel, explored
the possibility of a carefully phrased dialogue with opposition groups
(especially the Peronists) that might produce a limited political opening.
However, the hard-line faction grew increasingly restive throughout this
period, and were particularly alarmed by the public displays of opposition that
accompanied disclosure of the dialogo politico . In December 1981, using Viola's
heart ailment as a pretext, the hard-liners removed him from office and
installed General Leopoldo Galtieri, a well-known duro who had been deeply
involved in the "dirty war," and who promptly moved to restore the "liberal"
economic program and crack down on dissent.
However unknowingly at the time, Galtieri' s installation as president
marked the beginning of the third and final phase of the "Proceso,": that of
authoritarian collapse. This was due to the fact that overcoming the divisions
within the armed forces that emerged in 1981 required a move towards internal
reconstitution that went far beyond the return to liberal economic policies.
The need for internal reconstitution forced the military hierarchy to look for a
common objective upon which both factions could agree, and which simultaneously
could divert domestic attention away from the economic crisis while justifying
intensified repression against the rising opposition. By April, 1982, an
objective had been agreed upon and selected by the military hierarchy. This
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common objective lay 400 miles off the Patagonian coast. 121
One interesting sidelight to the Falkland/Maivinas Islands conflict is that
it could very well have been the Beagle Channel Islands that provided such an
external diversion. In 1978 Argentina and Chile had almost come to blows over
the disputed islands, and tensions remained high thereafter. However, the
Argentines were unwilling to take on the Chileans for three reasons. First,
they were wary of the Chilean armed forces, whose fighting abilities were
considered to be very strong. Second, they were loathe to attack another
military regime. Besides providing Pinochet and his minions with an external
diversion, the ensuing conflict would inevitably result in the downfall of one
or the other regime (or both), which could have negative repercussive effects at
home even in the event of victory. Finally, and most importantly, the
reoccupation of the Falkland/Maivinas Islands was a poorly staged bluff (evident
in the use of conscripts with six weeks training and dressed in summer uniforms
as the bulk of a winter occupation force). The military hierachy believed that
Great Britain would not call the bluff, thus making the re-occupation a
seemingly easy and inexpensive ploy.
Needless to say, Galtieri and his cohorts seriously underestimated the will
and capabilities of Margaret Thatcher (to say nothing of ignore her own domestic
problems that welcomed exactly such an external diversion) , as well as the
attitude of the United States. Misinterpreting the Reagan administration's
abandorment of the Carter human rights policy as blanket approval of their rule
and methods (augmented by their role as U.S. proxy counter- insurgency advisors
in Central America), the military leaders of the "Proceso" decided that Great
Britain would not attempt to forcibly re-take the islands, especially with the
U.S. supporting the Argentine claim. When neither of these two assumptions
proved correct, the fate of the "Proceso" was sealed, and the process of
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authoritarian collapse began in earnest. In effect, lacking the capacity to
learn lessons from historical experience beyond the utility of state terror as
an instrument of domination (particularly the experience of the Greek colonels
in Cyprus a few short years before), the "Proceso" responded to the confluence
of internal and external pressures by cooking up a classic recipe for
authoritarian collapse in the form of the Falklands/Malvinas adventure. '*2
In any case, defeat in the war with Great Britain left the military
completely discredited and in internal disarray, and virtually devoid of
civilian allies, including its erstwhile supporters. Coupled with the
ever-worsening economic crisis, the regime decided to abandon power and
scheduled open elections for late 1983. On December 10 of that year, Radical
Party candidate Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated president of the Argentine
Republic, ushering in a new (and hopefully successful) period of democratic
politics to that long-suffering nation. One of his first tasks was to move to
overcame the negative social legacy of the "Proceso" by opening his government
to various sectoral interests while at the same time ordering the prosecution
and trial of the military officers that were its leaders. While the trials have
concluded with the conviction and sentencing of several of these officers, it
remains to be seen if the full range of wounds opened by the "Proceso" will be
overcome in the near future.
VI II. Conclusion
During its initial phase the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" was an
exercise in dominio characterized by the systematic application of state terror
to complement an economic program that pursued a particular social vision with
an overt, (yet differentiated) class content that emerged as a response to
— and was a product of — the organic crisis that gripped Argentina in March,
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1976. The campaign of state terror spanned a range of manifestations that sought
to cover the full spectrum of Argentine social life. This included legal and
political restrictions designed to weaken the organizational capacity of the
excluded social groups to defend their collective interests, "mere" coercion and
repression used to enforce these restrictions against those who attempted to
defy them, and wholescale state enforcement terrorism that sought to rupture the
very fabric of society, disrupt collective identities, and break the individual
capacity and will of excluded group members to resist the regime's moves against
them. Underscoring this broad range of state terror was a socioeconomic project
with a basic class content, both in regards to beneficiaries and victims, as
well as in its systematic method and uniformity of direction. State terror was,
in effect, applied systematically, rationally, multivariously, and extensively
in pursuit of a specific socio-economic project prescribed by the social groups
who comprised the historical bloc dominant at that period in time: the
agro-export and transnational elites along with their non-class civilian allies
and the military hierarchy.
As an exercise in dcminio , the "Proceso" was both a sophisticated, yet
most crude form of authoritarian rule. Moreover, it was a salient manifesta-
tion, if not ultimate expression, of the zero-sun nature of economic and
political competition that has plagued Argentina throughout the postwar years,
and which lie at the core of the hegemonic stalemate and organic crisis that had
brought the nation to the verge of collapse in 1976. Most tragically, it
represented a turn backward, to the most egotistical, arrogant, and darker side
of the Argentine psyche. For this reason, it is appropriate that we leave
Gramsci with the last word. Whatever its purported intentions, the "Proceso"
ultimately revealed itself to be "the government of an economic class that did
not know how ... to exercise a hegemony beyond dictatorship. . . It was a
reactionary, repressive movement. "^23
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after a day-long demonstration on his behalf in front of the government house
by a huge crowd of working class supporters).
9Statement published in La Prensa , October 23, 1979.
9
^For a good examination of the full scope of these measures, particularly
as they were applied to the labor movement, see B. Gallitelli and A. Thompson,
eds., Sindicalismo y Regimenes Militares en Argentina y Chile . Amsterdam:
Centro de Estudios y Documentacion Latinoamericanos (CEDIA), 1982, Part 2:
"Argentina, Sindicalismo y Regimen Militar," pp. 91-225 (essays by Falcon,
Gallitelli and Thompson, and Munck).
^On the impact of these more "subtle" forms of coercion on society, and
within the educational system in particular, see A. Spitta, "El 'Proceso de
Reorganizacio'n Nacional 1 de 1976 a 1981: los objetivos basicos y su
realizacion practica, " pp. 80-83, 90-97.
™On the notion of hegemony preceeding the conquest of political power,
see Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes . London: New Left
Books, 1974, pp. 190-210. On the role of "ideological apparatuses" (or what
Gramsci called hegemonic apparatuses) in the achievement of hegemony see Louis
Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays . New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1971. pp. 143-148.
lOOrphg portion of the national budget allocated to these sectors fell from
6 percent in 1975 to less than 3 percent in 1981 . See S. Belmartino,
C. Bloch, and Z. T. de Quinteros, "El Programa de Estabilizacion Economica y
las Politicas de Salud y Bienestar Social: 1976-1980," Cuadernos Medico
Sociales , N. 18 (October 1981), pp. 25-26; J. Bello, "Politica de Salud
1976/81. Aporte para la evaluacion de un proceso," Cuadernos Medico Sociales
,
N. 23 (March 1983), pp. 25-28; M. B. Gonzales, "Healthcare: Another Victim
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of the Junta," Latinamerica Press , V. 15, N. 30 (August 25, 1983), p. 6; and
Buchanan, Regime Change and State Development in Postwar Argentina , chapter 4.
^^Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros, "El Programa de Estabilizacion
Economica y las Politicas de Salud y Bienestar Social: 1976-1980," pp. 26-30;
Bello, "Politica de Salud 1976/81. Aporte para la evaluacion de un proceso,"
pp. 28-30.
'"2por an excellent study of the effects of these measures on individual
strategies for securing health and welfare services, see Juan J. Llovet,
Servicios de Salud y Sectores Populares. Los Anos del Proceso . Buenos Aires:
CEDES, 1984. For a general view of the regime's health program and its
effects, see S. Bermann and J. C. Escudero, "Health in Argentina under the
Military Junta," International Journal of Health Services , V. 8, N. 3 (1978),
pp. 531-540.
^^Belmarinto, Bloch, and de Quinteros, "El Programa de Estabilizacion
Econcmica y las Politicas de Salud y Bienestar Social: 1976-1980," pp. 31-32;
Bello, "Politica de Salud 1976/81. Aporte para la evaluacion de un proceso,"
pp. 21-26; Gonzales, "Health Care: Another Victim of the Junta," pp. 6-7;
and Bermann and Escudero, "Health in Argentina under the Military Junta,"
p. 534.
"lO^On these strikes and the regime's response to them, see Ricardo Falco"n,
"Conflicto Social y Regimen Militar. La Resistencia Obrera en Argentina
(Marzo 1976-Marzo 1981)," in Sindicalismo y Regimenes Militares en Argentina
y Chile , pp. 91-139; and Leon E. Bieber, '"El movimiento laboral argentino
a partir de 1976," in El Poder Militar en la Argentina, 1976-1981
,
pp. 116-122.
105pne most prominent case was that of Jacobo Timerman, publisher of the
newspaper La Opinion , who complained in a number of editorials in 1976 that
the scope of the repressive campaign was unwarranted. For his troubles, in
1977 this erstwhile supporter of the military regime (and long-term anti-
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Peronist and golpista ) was arrested and jailed without charge, where he was
subjected to physical and psychological torture. Amid intense international
pressure, he was released and deported to Israel in 1979. For his version of
events, see Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number . New York: Random
House, 1981. Unlike Timerman, there were dozens of other journalists who
never re-appeared after their arrests.
1 0Sjr^g atrocities committed by the military regime have received consider-
able international attention, and have been well documented by various
organizations. Among others, see the human rights reports issued periodically
by the Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos, Centro de Estudios
Legales (CEIS) and Servicio Paz y Justicia, all of Buenos Aires, as well as
those of Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the O.A.S., and the U.S.
government during the period 1976-1980. The description of the activities
and methods of the paramilitary squads offered here is derived from these
sources and others, as well as from personal interviews conducted in Buenos
Aires in 1983.
^O'Astiz is currently on trial in Buenos Aires on charges of torture and
murder. His capture by British forces in 1982 sparked an international
uproar, as victims living in exile in Europe, Canada and the United States
tried to have him extradited to stand trial in their respective jurisdictions.
As a prisoner of war, he was returned to Argentina in the prisoner exchange
that followed the cessation of hostilities. Vivid testimony of his actions at
the Naval Mechanics School has been reported extensively in the Argentine
press, particularly during the Fall of 1984, when his trial began. See Clarin,
October-December 1984, for an almost daily recampilation of these events.
1 08Reve ]_at;LOns f these and other methodical applications of terror
(existance of concentration camps, use of crematoria, mass executions, secret
gravesites, etc.) have been extensively documented by the investigative
ccmmision (the Sabato Commission) charged by President Alfonsin with determi-
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ning the extent of human rights violations and fate of these who "disappeared"
during the "Proceso." See the Informe de la Comision Nacional sobre la
Desaparicion de Personas . Buenos Aires: Presidencia de la Nacion, Secretaria
de Informacion, September 1984. Additional information on the "dirty war"
surfaced during the trial of nine former junta members (all military officers)
recently concluded in Buenos Aires.
^O^Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks
, p. 232.
I'^Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere , Vol. 2, pp. 808-809, cited in
P. Anderson, "The Antimonies of Antonio Gramsci," p. 31.
^Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos, Lista de los
Detenidos-Desaparecidos . Buenos Aires: n.d., 1981, p. 4. Also see B.
Gallitelli and A. Thompson, "La Situacion Laboral en la Argentina del




"Despues del Diluvio, La Clase Obrera," p. 140.
' '-^Falcon, "Conflicto Social y Regimen Militar. La Resistencia Obrera
en Argentina (Marzo 1976-Marzo 1981)," p. 98.
''
^Gallitelli and Thompson, "La Situacion Laboral en la Argentina del
'Proceso,' 1976-1981," pp. 150-151.
115Ibid., pp. 155-156.
'
'^See the petition filed by the Transportation Workers of America
(AFL-CIO) before the Civil Aeronautics Board on July 31, 1979, charging
Aerolineas Argentinas (which was managed by the Air Force) with unfair
labor practices. Also see "Exporting Repression — Argentina Style," Soho
News , V. 6, N. 44 (August 2-8, 1979).
^^See Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number , for
the role anti-semitism played in his abduction and subsequent incarceration,
as well as within the "dirty war" in general. There is a fairly extensive
literature on the subject of anti-semitism under the "Proceso." Among others,
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see R. Weisbrot, "The Seige of the Argentine Jews, " New Republic , V. 184 (June
27, 1981), pp. 16-21; and G. W. Wynia, "The Argentine Revolution Falters, "
Current History , V. 81, N. 2 (February 1982), pp. 74-77, 87-88.
1 18Gramsci , Selections from the Prison Notebooks
, p. 54 (note 4).
l-^This notion of individual regression under conditions of state terror
leading to a wide-spread condition of alienation within excluded social groups
paraphrases the argument developed by Guillermo A. O'Donnell at the "Seminar
on Issues on Democracy and Democratization, North and South, " held at the
Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, on November 14-16, 1983. Any
errors of interpretation or misidentification are my own. For a more precise
analysis of O'Donnell' s views, see Carlos H. Acuna and Robert Barros, "Issues
on Democracy and Democratization: North and South — A Rapporteur ' s Report. "
Kellogg Institute Working Paper N. 30 (October 1984), pp. 9-10.
120i first heard this phrase in 1983 while in Buenos Aires, used by the
children of a friend who as a Peronist Youth leader had been forced
underground for five years in order to avoid the security apparatus (since he
was marked for "disappearance"). I later discovered that it was a phrase
commonly used by Argentine children to scare each other, much in the way my
five year old talks about ghosts and monsters. In their case, however, the
monsters were very real.
121This account of the final two phases of the "Proceso" is drawn from
the analyses offered in Andres Fontana, "Fuerzas Armadas, Partidos Politicos y
TransicLon a la Democracia en Argentina 1981-1982," Kellogg Institute Working
Paper N. 28 (July, 1984); and David Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in
Argentina: 1976-1983," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , V.
27, N. 4 (Summer, 1985), pp. 55-76.
122por a sampling of views on the Falklands/Malvinas campaign frcm an
Argentine perspective, see Carlos Altamirano, "Lecciones de una guerra, " Punto
de Vista , V. 1 (August-October, 1982); and Guillermo Makin, "Argentine
74
Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to Violence Foreseeable?"
International Affairs , V. 59 (Summer, 1983), pp. 391-403.
^3Qramsc i f Letters from Prison , p. 205 (letter written to this sister-
in-law Tania from the prison colony of Turi, September 7, 1931). I must note
that in writing about the medieval communes (from which this quote is taken),
Gramsci stated that they "did not know how to create (their) own category of
intellectuals" and thus could not exercise hegemony. In the case of the
"Proceso," Martinez de Hoz and his "liberal" cadre were the regime's
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